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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study is to create a profile of U.S. Army troops killed or injured due 
to hostile incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq between 2003 and 2011.  
The file used in this study was obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC). It was built from active-duty personnel extract files, covering the period from 
2003 to 2011. 
Our study shows that pay grades E1 through E3 are more likely to be involved in 
hostile incidents than other pay-grade groups, and that probability of injury or death 
decreases as pay grade increases. The findings for gender are not parallel to popular 
ideas. Male servicemen are less likely to get killed or injured than women after adjusting 
for other casualties. In terms of the effects of marital status, our study shows that married 
servicemen are more likely to be involved in hostile incidents. In our model, we found 
that regular forces have a lower risk of engaging in hostile incidents than guard and 
reserve forces, which is contrary to general expectation. The results for MOS (Military 
Occupational Specialty) were as expected. Combat troops are more likely to be killed or 
injured than other troops. 
As a conclusion for our multivariate model, an actual-duty person who is female, 
married, serving in the reserve forces, serving in a combat troop, between pay grades E1–
E3, serving in Iraq, serving the first deployment is the serviceman with most potential to 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
U.S. troops have been involved in two major wars since 2001 and over 35,000 
servicemen of the Army have been either injured or killed due to hostile incidents in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. The purpose of this study is to create a profile of U.S. troops killed or 
injured due to hostile incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
The file used in this study was obtained from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC). It was built from active-duty personnel extract files, covering the period from 
2003 to 2011. To avoid the official limitations of using SSNs (social-security numbers), 
we received a file arranged according to identification numbers for each individual, rather 
than by SSN.  
The data set contained information on death or injury date, injury status, death or 
injury country and city, service, military occupation specialties (MOS), gender, 
education, race and ethnicity, age, marital status, number of deployments, armed-forces 
time in service and pay grade, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), religion, race, 
death state, death country, home city, home country, service-branch classification code, 
ethnic affinity, and U.S. citizenship. In our study, we did not include death state, death 
country, home city, and home country because all were U.S.A. We did not include AFQT 
because officers do not take this test, nor are religion, race and U.S. citizenship accounted 
in our study. The file contained 48,312 records, representing all servicemen either injured 
or killed, and a sample consisting of 98,812 records of servicemen who served in the 
2003–2011 period without injury. In our data, we used only servicemen killed or injured 
in hostile action, of whom there were 35,698. 
The results suggest that pay grades E1 through E3 are more likely to be involved 
in hostile incidents than other pay-grade groups, and this exposure to danger decreases as 
pay grade increases. The findings for gender are not parallel to popular ideas. It is 
expected that males will be more exposed to hostile incidents than females. But even 
though the difference is not large, our results show that males are less likely to get killed 
or injured. In terms of the effects of marital status, our study shows that married 
 xvi 
servicemen are more likely to be involved in hostile incidents. In our model, we found 
that regular forces have a lower risk of engaging in hostile incidents than guard and 
reserve forces, which is contrary to general expectation. The results for MOS were as 
expected. Combat troops are more likely to be killed or injured than other troops. 
As a conclusion for our multivariate model, an actual-duty person who is female, 
married, serving in the reserve forces, serving in a combat role, between pay grades E1–
E3, and serving the first deployment in Iraq, is the soldier most likely to get injured or 
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The environment faced by today’s servicemen is characterized by continual 
deployments to combat zones, where troops are exposed to the risks of the battlefield. 
Casualty, whether to combatants or noncombatants, is an unavoidable reality of war. 
Although the primary goal of combat is to defeat the enemy, keeping casualties down is 
important as well. Low numbers of injured or killed soldiers not only maintain the ranks 
of service members, but also have an incredible effect on morale.  
U.S. troops have been involved in two major wars since 2001, and over 35,000 
soldiers have been either injured or killed due to hostile incidents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
The deaths and injuries of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan are well publicized, 
but casualty totals alone do not indicate the risk for a given serviceman. A study by 
Buzzel and Preston reveals that the risk of death in Iraq shows considerable variability. It 
is highest in the Marine Corps, lowest in the Air Force, higher among enlisted troops than 
officers, much higher for men than women, and declines sharply with age. Hispanics 
have a higher death rate than non-Hispanics, and blacks have unusually low mortality in 
Iraq. (Buzzel and Preston, 2007) 
To assess the risk to a serviceman who is exposed to a hostile incident, a 
multivariate analysis of factors causing these casualties will produce a better 
understanding of this least desired outcome of war. 
B. THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this study is to create a profile of U.S. troops killed or injured due 
to hostile incidents in Afghanistan and Iraq, by answering the following research 
questions. 
• Does the number of deployments of servicemen have an effect on casualty 
status? 
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• Does experience (time in service) have an effect on casualty status? 
• Is there a significant difference in casualty rates among the combat, 
combat service, and combat-service support branches in the Army? 
• Is there a significant difference in casualty rates among the regular, guard, 
and reserve forces in the Army? 
• Is there a significant difference in casualty rates among the ranks in the 
Army? 
• Do demographics like age, gender, and marital status have any effect on 
casualty status? 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II provides a background of the wars considered and a review of previous 
studies. Chapter III provides descriptive statistics of the data. Chapter IV covers the 
methodology used, which includes a brief overview of logistic regression, a description 
of the variables and model, and results of the analysis. The final chapter presents a 
summary and recommendations. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE IRAQ WAR 
The Iraq War was a conflict that occurred in Iraq from March 2003 to December 
2011. Before the war, United States asserted that Iraq’s possession of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) was a threat to its security and allies. In 2002, the United Nations 
Security Council passed Resolution 1441, which called for Iraq to completely cooperate 
with UN inspectors to verify that Iraq was not in possession of WMDs. (Shakir, 2006) 
The invasion of Iraq led to an occupation and the capture of President Saddam 
Hussein, who was tried in an Iraqi court and executed by the new Iraqi government. 
Violence against Coalition forces and among various sectarian groups led to an Iraqi 
insurgency and discord between Sunni and Shia Iraqi groups. 
As public opinion favoring troop withdrawals increased and Iraqi forces began to 
take responsibility for security, member nations of the Coalition withdrew their forces. 
The United States and Iraqi governments had several agreements aimed at ensuring 
cooperation in constitutional rights, threat deterrence, education, energy development, 
and other areas. (Karadsheh, 2008) 
In February 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama publicized a withdrawal plan for 
U.S. forces, with approximately 50,000 troops to remain in the country in non-combat 
operations. (Londoño, 2010) 
On October 2011, President Obama announced that all U.S. troops would leave 
Iraq by the end of the year, bringing the U.S. mission in Iraq to an end. On December 15, 
2011, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta officially declared the end of the Iraq War in 
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           War began on 19 March 2003 with 173,000 troops, 150,000 of whom were      
Americans 
  670,000 Iraqi security forces were on duty as of March 2011 
  4,408 American troops have been killed 
  179 British troops have been killed 
  115,405 Iraqi civilians are estimated to have been killed 
  32,195 American troops have been wounded 
Table 1.   The War in Iraq in Numbers 
Source: Brookings Iraq Index, U.S. Department of Defense 
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2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	  
67700	   130600	   143600	   141100	   148300	   157800	   135600	   88300	   42800	  
Table 2.   Number of U.S. Troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 
(Belasco, Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars, FY2001-FY2012: Cost and Other 
Potential Issues, 2009) 
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS 
FATALITIES AS OF: MARCH 30, 2012 
 KIA WIA TOTAL 
OIF U. S. Military Casualties 3,479 31,923 35,402 
Table 3.   The Number of Hostile Casualties in OIF between 2003 and 2011 
Source: http://www.defense.gov/news/casualty.pdf 
B. THE AFGANISTAN WAR 
United States, the United Kingdom, and the Commonwealth of Australia invaded 
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, launching Operation Enduring Freedom. The primary 
reason for the invasion was the September 11 attacks on the United States, and OEF had 
the stated goal of demolishing the al-Qaeda terrorist organization and ending its use of 
Afghanistan as a base. The United States also said that it would remove the Taliban 
regime from power and creates a democratic state (Wintour, 2001). The United States 
forced the Taliban from power in Afghanistan, and compelled it to cease its support for 
terrorist organizations. By removing the Taliban, the United States denied the terrorists 
the sanctuary they had enjoyed in Afghanistan and the support they had received from the 
Taliban. In addition, the United States was successful in killing or capturing many 
Taliban leaders and fighters. However, many important Taliban leaders remain at large 
and continue to support al-Qaeda. After ten years of war, the United States continues to 
battle a widespread Taliban insurgency (Herring, 2003). 
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OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) U.S. CASUALTY STATUS 
FATALITIES AS OF: MARCH 30, 2012 
 KIA WIA TOTAL 
OEF U. S. Military Casualties 1,503 15,516 17,019 




Figure 2.   U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 
2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	  
10400	   15200	   19100	   20400	   23700	   30100	   50700	   63500	   63500	  
Table 5.   Number of U.S. Troops in Iraq between 2003 and 2011 
(Belasco, 2009) 
C. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
1. Study by Buzzel and Preston (2007)  
In their 2007 study, Buzzel and Preston examine how death risks vary according 
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asserted that these risks vary from person to person, depending on such factors as branch 
of service, rank, age, sex, race, and ethnicity. 
 They constructed death rates for members of the United States military deployed 
to Iraq between March 2003 and September 2006. Data on the number and characteristics 
of troops deployed to Iraq were taken from Department of Defense website and Defense 
Manpower Data Center. The authors examined 2,706 deaths of U.S. troops in Iraq. They 
did not differentiate as to cause of death; this number includes deaths from all causes, 
whether hostile or not, as well as incidents that were directly related to in–theater 
operations in Iraq, even if they had occurred in another country. 
The authors first analyzed differences in death rates according to branch of 
service and concluded that there was a huge difference among the services with respect to 
exposure to combat. Their study states that the rate death of Marines was more than 
double that of any other branch of service. 
 Death rate per 1,000 Ratio of death rate to total death rate 
Army 4.07 1.012 
Marine Corps 8.59 2.140 
Navy 0.92 0.229 
Air Force 0.37 0.093 
Total 4.02 1.000 
Table 6.   Number of Deaths and Relative Mortality Levels Per Deployment by Military 
Branch and Service Component, Iraq War, 2003-2006 
Second, the authors analyzed death rates according to component of service. Their 
study showed that the active-Army risk of death was three times greater than that of 
Army reservists deployed to Iraq. They consider this difference to be a reflection of the 
fact that most members of the active Army were in C (combat) forces, while reservists 
were mostly in CS (combat support) and CSS (combat service support). In their analysis 
of Marines, they could not find a significant difference between active and reserve forces. 
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In their third analysis, the authors examined death rates according to rank. What 
they found is parallel to the one of the oldest observations in the social sciences, that low-
ranking soldiers experience a greater risk of death than higher-ranked individuals. In the 
Army, those in the rank of private first class had a death risk three times greater than the 
combined categories of major, colonel, and general. The enlisted men had 38% higher 
mortality than officers. The same ratio was applicable to Marines as well. Lance 
corporals had a death risk 4.18 times greater than that of majors, colonels, and generals, 
and the single highest mortality group in any service consisted of lance corporals, whose 
death risk was 3.1 times that of all troops in Iraq. 
The authors’ fourth analysis was death rates according to age and sex. Their 
finding was that the male risk was 5.8 times that of females. They explained the 
difference by noting that women deployed to Iraq are not permitted to hold combat 
positions. Their analysis of age demonstrated a large mortality difference by age. In 
comparison to the civilian population, mortality rates declined precipitously with age. 
Troops aged 17–19 had a risk 4.4 times greater than that of troops aged 50 and older. 
This slope is explained by the distribution of rank and service affiliation by age. Another 
factor making the death rates higher among young troops was their inexperience within 
rank and branch of service. 
As a conclusion, the authors state that the death rate of U.S. military personnel in 
Iraq was three times higher than the death rate of young Americans, but it was five times 
lower than the death rate of American troops serving in Vietnam. The Marines had a 
higher death risk than any other service. The death risk was higher for males than females 
and went down sharply with age. 
In their study, the authors did not include wounded servicemen because they 
lacked the information needed to create a like profile. Another limitation of the study was 
that they did not differentiate between hostile and non-hostile incidents. 
2. Study by Curtis and Payne (2010) 
In their 2010 study, the authors investigate the disproportionate impact on rural 
communities of United States troop mortality in Iraq. Their study showed that troops 
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from non-metropolitan areas had higher mortality after accounting for the 
disproportionate enlistment of non-metropolitan youth, and that the non-metropolitan 
disadvantage generally persisted across military branch and rank. Moreover, most of the 
differential was due to higher risks of mortality for non-metropolitan, African-American 
and Hispanic military personnel, compared to metropolitan enlistees of the same race or 
ethnicity. 
The authors start their analysis by addressing whether rural communities were 
more significantly affected by mortality in the Iraq War than urban communities. They 
disaggregated mortality data by the non-metropolitan status of the reported home 
counties of the dead and estimated whether troops from rural communities have a greater 
risk of death. Their analysis covered all U.S. military deaths since the invasion of Iraq, 
March 2003, through December 31, 2007, as reported by iCasualities and the Department 
of Defense (DoD). They used census definitions of metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
counties to analyze enlistment and death rates for all military personnel, disaggregated by 
non-metropolitan status, in addition to several risk factors associated with higher death 
rates, namely, military branch, rank within branch, and race or ethnicity. Their approach 
enables us to examine the extent to which the human costs of the Iraq War differentially 
affect rural communities. 
In their study of rank, the authors examined whether a greater portion of non-
metropolitan deaths were concentrated among the enlisted and lower ranks. They 
disaggregated the number of deaths and calculated the proportion of deaths, by rank, for 
non-metropolitan and metropolitan troops. They observed a similar pattern of mortality 
by rank for non-metropolitan and metropolitan troops. Compared to metropolitan troops, 
a greater concentration of deaths was found for non-metropolitan troops in the Army, 
especially among enlisted troops in the Army and, more specifically, Army sergeants; 
37% of all non-metropolitan deaths were concentrated among Army sergeants, compared 
with 30% of all metropolitan deaths. There was a negligible difference between the 
proportions of total deaths among lower-ranked enlisted Army personnel. Likewise, there 
was little observed difference between non-metropolitan and metropolitan Army officers 
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or among Marines, whether enlisted or officers. The differences between non-
metropolitan and metropolitan mortality appeared to be concentrated among Army 
sergeants. 
The authors further examined mortality by calculating the relative risk of death 
for non-metropolitan troops by deployment and found evidence of a non-
metropolitan/metropolitan inconsistency within rank. Results showed that the relative risk 
of mortality was generally higher for non-metropolitan enlisted troops and lower for non-
metropolitan officers. Differences were especially evident in the Army; non-metropolitan 
enlistees have a 31% greater risk of mortality relative to their metropolitan counterparts. 
Among Army sergeants, those with the highest proportion of total deaths had a 48% 
greater risk of dying than metropolitan soldiers, and among officers, non-metropolitan 
officers had a 15% lower risk of death than metropolitan officers. The non-metropolitan 
disadvantage decreased with rank. 
The authors found that African-Americans had a lower risk of death than whites 
across the metropolitan dimension. Non-metropolitan white troops had a 52% higher risk 
of mortality than non-metropolitan African-American personnel, while metropolitan 
white personnel were 2.7 times as likely to die as metropolitan African-Americans. 
Casualties among African-American personnel accounted for 7% of all non-metropolitan 
deaths and 10% of metropolitan deaths. Curtis and Payne explain this by citing the career 
intentions of African-Americans and their associated combat exposure. 
As a conclusion, the authors’ analysis of mortality among U.S. military troops 
indicates that non-metropolitan areas were experiencing a higher cost of the Iraq War. 
Troops from non-metropolitan counties had higher rates of death regardless of cause or 
military branch. Death rates inherently adjusted for differential enlistment suggested that 
non-metropolitan troops were at a greater risk of death after accounting for higher 
enlistment. But they did not answer the question why non-metropolitan troops 
experienced higher death rates and why rural communities bear a disproportionate burden 
of war. 
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D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There are few publicized studies concerning the hostility casualties of U.S. troops 
in the two major wars the U.S. has been involved in since 2003. Both studies above 
include only deaths that occurred between 2003 and 2007 and do not differentiate causes 
of death. These deaths include both combat and non-combat related and cover only the 
incident that happened the Iraq War, whereas, in our study, we focus on combat-related 
casualties only, including death and injury, and cover incidents that happened in either 
Iraq or Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. Both studies cover the Marine Corps, Air 
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III. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the data and sample used in our statistical analyses, 
provides descriptions of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the models, and 
presents basic descriptive statistics. 
B. DATA SOURCE 
The file used in this study was obtained from the DMDC. It was built from active-
duty personnel extract files, covering the period from 2003 to 2011. To avoid the official 
limitations of using SSNs, we received a file arranged according to an identification 
number for each individual rather than by SSN. 
The data set contained information on death or injury date, injury status, death or 
injury country and city, service, MOS, gender, education, race and ethnicity, age, marital 
status, number of deployments, armed force time in service and pay grade, AFQT, 
religion, race, death state, death country, home city, home country, service branch 
classification code, ethnic affinity and U.S. citizenship. In our study, we did not include 
death state, death country, home city, and home country because all were U.S.A. We did 
not include AFQT because officers do not take this test and religion, race and U.S. 
citizenship are not accounted in our study as well. The file contained 48,312 records of 
servicemen either injured or killed and 98,812 records of servicemen who served in the 
2003–2011 period without injury. In our data, we used only army servicemen killed or 
injured in hostile action, of whom there were 35,698. 
1. Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
The dependent variable is binary and indicates whether the Army servicemen 
were injured or killed in a hostile action. The explanatory variables include demographic 
and military characteristics. Demographic characteristics include age, gender, number of 
dependents, and marital status. The military characteristics include branch, organization 
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code, pay grade, incident country, time in service, and number of deployments. Table 7 
presents casualty numbers over the years for all variables used in the study. 
VARIABLES 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
NUMBER OF 
CASUALTIES  2411 5079 4790 4863 6324 2631 2356 3555 3689 
INCIDENT 
COUNTRY 
IZ 2279 4886 4529 4419 5488 1964 644 376 248 
AF 96 189 259 431 762 653 1698 3158 3612 
MOS 
COMBAT 986 2301 2470 2546 3492 1510 1502 2589 2756 
COMBAT 




509 1115 800 674 899 363 338 548 761 
ORAGNIZATION 
CODE 
REGULAR 1831 3430 2692 4044 5361 2208 1847 2942 3338 
GUARD 286 1051 1677 612 699 342 450 468 392 
RESERVE 294 598 421 207 264 81 59 145 139 
GENDER 
MALE 2310 4915 4696 4767 6207 2592 2322 3488 3759 




 7.94 9.81 4.85 5.78 5.89 5.85 5.22 5.13 4.58 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
MARRIED 1237 2618 2483 2444 2924 1396 1237 1892 2052 
NEVER 
MARRIED 940 2301 2063 2200 2806 1048 940 1369 1592 
DIVORCED 87 136 203 168 205 86 87 115 113 
Table 7.   Dependent and Explanatory Variables (continue to next page) 
 15 




 1.95 1.81 1.85 1.97 1.98 2.04 1.93 1.89 1.78 
NUMBER OF 
DEPENDENTS  1.14 1.18 1.12 1.22 1.28 1.36 1.31 1.33 1.29 
AGE  26.00 27.31 27.39 26.21 25.90 26.60 26.07 24.42 22.65 
PAY GRADE 
OFFICER 174 351 287 299 401 189 134 231 235 
E13 521 909 778 976 1463 532 535 996 988 
E45 1272 2906 2847 2668 3386 1402 1266 2092 2082 
E69 444 913 878 920 1074 509 422 580 564 
Table 7.     Dependent and Explanatory Variables (cont.) 
2. Data Description by Number of Casualties 
 
Figure 3.   Number of Casualties 
Figure 3 shows the total number of hostile casualties that occurred between 2003 
and 2011 in Iraq and Afghanistan. The number of hostile casualties among U.S. troops 









2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	  
Number of Casualties 
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number reached 5,079. In the following three years, the number of casualties did not 
change considerably. In 2007, the number of casualties increased by 1,461, reaching 
6,324. This increase can be partly explained by the increased number of troops deployed 
to Afghanistan and Iraq, and is the highest number of casualties in 2003–2011. The 
number of casualties dropped significantly in 2008 to 2,631 and the following year 
reached its lowest value, 2,356. From 2009, the casualty number went up to around 3,500 
for the following two years. This change can be explained by the change in focus of U.S. 
troops, from Iraq to Afghanistan. 
3. Data Description by Incident Country 
 
Figure 4.   Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan 
Figure 4 shows the number of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003, the 
number of incidents in Afghanistan was lower than in Iraq. The number of troops 
deployed to Iraq was six times greater than the number deployed to Afghanistan, and the 
number of casualties that occurred in Iraq was twenty-three times greater. In 2004, the 
U.S. forces operating in Iraq doubled, reaching 130,600, and the number of hostile 
casualties doubled as well, increasing to 4,886. On the other hand, U.S. forces operating 
in Afghanistan increased by 50%, reaching 15,200; but the number of hostile casualties 
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incremented by more than 10,000, but the incidents in those two years decreased by 7.4% 
in the first year and 9.6% in the second. In Afghanistan, troop size continued to grow by 
50% for the year 2005, reaching 20,000, and the casualty percentage increased by 27% in 
the first year and 54% the following year. In 2007, the troop size extended to 148,300 and 
the number of hostile incidents increased to 5,488. This was the highest number of hostile 
casualties occurring in one year since 2003. In the same year, the troops in Afghanistan 
increased by 14%, but the casualty numbers increased by 43%. Although the number of 
troops deployed to Iraq reached its peak by year 2008, there was a sharp 65% drop in the 
number of casualties. In the following three years, until 2011, casualties decreased 
steadily. Meanwhile, the number of casualties in Afghanistan increased as the number of 
troops grew. Between 2009 and 2011, troop size increased by 40% for the first year and 
17% for the second year, but the casualty number increased by 62% for the first year and 
46.3 % for the second year. 
In conclusion, there was a significant change in casualty numbers in Iraq in 2008, 
with a 65% drop in hostile casualties. The number decreased until 2011 when the U.S. 
left Iraq officially. The picture in Afghanistan is a little different. As the number of troops 
incremented, the number of casualties increased as well, specifically, after 2008. 
4. Data Description by Pay Grade 
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Figure 5 shows casualty rates by pay grade in the U.S. Army between 2003 and 
2011. Of all casualties, pay grades E1, E2, and E3 (shown by E13, make up 21%, E4 and 
E5 (shown by E45) made up 55%, E6, E7, E8 and E9 (shown by E69) made up 18%, and 
all officers makes up 6%. For the officers shown by O, the casualty ratio changed 
between 6% and 7% between 2003 and 2011. It reached its highest number in 2007, in 
which 401 officers were killed or injured. But the ratio among other pay grades did not 
change, because U.S. troops suffered the highest number of hostile events in that year. 
For the E69, the casualty ratio fluctuated between 14.5% and 19.3%. The highest number 
occurred in 2007, with 1,074 events, but the highest ratio happened the next year. 
Although there was a declining trend in the casualty ratio with respect to other pay 
grades, dropping to 14.5% after 2008, the casualty numbers of E69 went from 500 to 560. 
E45 is the pay-grade range that suffered more than half of all hostile incidents. The 
casualty ratio for E45 moved between 52.7% and 59.3%. The highest number of 
casualties was in 2007, with 3,386 killed or injured U.S. servicemen. After 2005, the 
casualty ratio as compared to other pay grades was steady at around 53%. For the E13, 
the casualty ratio fluctuated between 16.2% and 25.5%. This is the pay grade with the 
highest difference in casualty rates. After 2008, there was a steady increase in both the 
number and ratio of casualties. 
5. Data Description by Number of C, CS, and CSS Troop Casualties 
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Figure 6 presents the casualty numbers of C, CS, and CSS troops serving in Iraq 
and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. For the CSS troops, the casualty percentage 
changed between 21% and 14%. It reached its highest value in 2004, with 1,115 troops 
killed or injured. Until 2008, there was a steady decrease in the number of hostile 
casualties, dropping to 363 troops; but after that year, the number went up with increasing 
slope, incrementing to 761 troops in 2011. This can be partly explained by the increased 
number of troops in Afghanistan. For CS troops, the casualty percentage ranged between 
8% and 14%. It reached its highest value in 2007, with 680 casualties. For the C troops, 
the casualty percentage changed between 41% and 71%. Its highest value was in 2007, 
with 3,492 casualties. Though there was a decrease in C-troop hostile casualties after 
2007, the percentage of C troops killed or injured increased. There was a constant rise in 
the percentage of C-troop casualties between 2003 and 2010. 
6. Data Description by Average Years in the Army 
 
Figure 7.   Casualties by Average Years in the Army 
Figure 7 presents the time in Army service before members were killed or injured. 
In the first years of the wars, years spent in the Army were above eight, but in 2005, the 
number dropped to 4.85 years. Between 2005 and 2008, the time in service before injury 
increased slightly to 5.85 years, but after that year, the number declined steadily and 
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7. Data Description by Organization Component Code 
 
Figure 8.   Casualties by Organization Component Code 
Figure 8 presents hostile casualty numbers and percentages of regular, reserve, 
and guard forces that served in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. In 2003, 
76% of casualties were regular forces and the ratio of guard forces and reserve forces was 
about the same. The casualty ratio of reserve forces decreased steadily up to 3.5% in 
2011. For the guard forces, there was a big jump in casualties between 2003 and 2005, 
from 11.8% to 35%. In 2006, there was a significant drop in the casualty ratio of guard 
forces, declining to 12.5%. After 2006, the casualty ratio of guard forces fluctuated 
between 10% and 12%. The average casualty ratio of regular forces was 77.6% between 
2003 and 2011. There had been a sharp decline until 2005, dropping to 56%, but in the 
same period there was a sharp increase in casualties among guard forces. In 2006, the 
ratio of regular forces jumped again, to 83%. After 2006 and until 2011, the ratio 
fluctuated between 78% and 86%. A close look at the regular and guard forces reveals a 
symmetrical pattern. Whenever there is a change in the ratio of one force, there is an 
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8. Data Description by Average Number of Deployments 
 
Figure 9.   Casualties by Average Numbers of Deployments 
Figure 9 shows the average number of deployments of U.S. troops before 
servicemen were injured or killed. The overall average number was 1.91 and fluctuated 
between 1.78 and 2.03 from 2003 to 2011. In 2004, the number dropped to 1.81 and after 
that year climbed constantly until 2008, reaching its highest value, 2.03 deployments. 
Following that year, the number of deployments decreased steadily until 2011, reaching 
its lowest value, 1.78 deployments. The declining trend after 2008 can be partly 
explained by an overall change in the U.S. Army. Figure 7 shows that the average years 
in the Army before getting killed or injured decreased, and in that figure we saw that time 
in service decreased steadily. Figure 10 shows that the age of casualties went down and 
Figure 5 shows that the ratio of hostile incidents after 2008 increased for service 
members between the E1 and E3 pay grades. We may infer that the average age of U.S. 
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9. Data Description by Average Age 
 
Figure 10.   Casualties by Average Age 
Figure 10 presents the average age of U.S. troops injured or killed in Iraq or 
Afghanistan. The average age was 25.83 years between 2003 and 2011. We observe no 
significant change until 2010, when the average casualty age fluctuated between 26 and 
27, but in 2010, the average casualty age dropped to 24.4. In the following year, the 
average age decreased to 22.6 years. In this figure, we see a pattern similar to that 
observed in deployment numbers and years spent in the Army. All three variables 
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10. Data Description by Gender 
 
Figure 11.   Casualties by Gender 
Figure 11 presents the gender of U.S. troops injured or killed in Iraq or 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. Ninety-eight percent of the casualties were male 
and 2% were female. This discrepancy may be explained by the fact that female service 
members were not allowed to serve as combat troops, which kept them away from 
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11. Data Description by Marital Status 
 
Figure 12.   Casualties by Marital Status 
Figure 12 presents the marital status of U.S. troops injured or killed in Iraq and 
Afghanistan between 2003 and 2011. There was not a significant observation in the ratio 
of divorced service members. The ratio of casualty changed between 3% and 4%. 
Married service members made the highest proportion with a ratio of over 50%. But this 
can be related with the proportion of married service members within the army. The 
casualty rate moved between 46% and 53.2%. In 2007, it reached its lowest value, while 
there was an increase in the casualty ratio of never-married service members. After 2007, 
the ratio went above 50% until 2011. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the data and sample used in the statistical analysis, 
provides descriptions of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the models, and 
presents basic descriptive statistics. 
Preliminary analysis shows that after 2008, there was a considerable decrease in 
hostile casualties in Iraq and an increase in casualties in Afghanistan. Figure 7 shows that 
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that time in service decreased steadily. Figure 10 shows the age of casualties going down 
and Figure 5 reveals that the ratio of hostile incidents after 2008 increases for service 
members in pay grades E1 to E3. We may infer that U.S. troops suffering casualties in 
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IV. ANALYSIS 
A. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
This chapter contains the results of multivariate analysis of the casualty status of 
servicemen of the U.S. Army. First, a brief description of logistic regression is presented, 
and then evaluation and interpretation of analysis for the model is provided. The chapter 
concludes with a summary and comparison of the results found in the logistic regression 
model. 
Regression methods are an integral part of any data analysis concerned with 
describing the relationships between a response variable and explanatory variables. 
Logistic regression is a well-known statistical technique for modeling data with binary 
outcomes. 
We wish to analyze the reasons of causality status (killed/injured or not). 
Therefore, logistic regression is preferred, because the outcome of casualty is binary. The 
dependent variable for every observation (i) is defined as Yi, which is coded 1 if the 
servicemen is injured or killed, and 0 otherwise. 
The theoretical model is: 
( p i / (1- p i))= 0 + 1 1 +...+ n n 
where, 
log ( p i / (1- p i) = Log of odds ratio for individual i 
p i = Probability injured or killed 
0 = Intercept 
 = Estimated coefficient (change in log odds for a unit change in s) 
= Values of explanatory variables 
 
  





The coefficients in the model represent the change in the log odds for a unit 
change in an X covariate. The X s capture the various demographic characteristics for the 
individuals, such as marital status, age, occupation component code, time in service, and 
rate of deployment. In logistic regression, the log-odds are generally assumed to be a 
linear function of various covariates. 
The odds are defined as the probability that an individual with a particular set of 
characteristics was injured or killed in a hostile action, divided by the probability that he 
was not. The odds can be any number between zero and infinity. Odds of one mean that a 
serviceman with a set of characteristics is equally likely to get injured or killed. Odds 
greater than one mean that such a serviceman is more likely to get injured or killed, while 
odds less than one mean the serviceman is less likely to get killed or injured. (Fricker and 
Buttrey, 2008) 
In our study, we analyzed two different models. In the first model, which we took 
as a base model, we have the variables without interactions, and in the second model, 
which is the alternative model; we have the interactions derived from the stepAIC 
function in R, which performs stepwise model selection by Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC). (Venables and Ripley, 2002). In order to choose the best model, we performed 
pseudo-R2 and Hosmer-Lomeshow tests. 
Pseudo-R2 test basically measures the percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable depending on changes in explanatory variables. The pseudo-R2 is the logistic 
regression analog to the R2 in linear regressions. It measures the proportion of deviance 
accounted for by the regression (Nagelkerke, 1991). Hosmer-Lomeshow test is a 
statistical test for goodness of fit for logistic regression models. The test assesses whether 
or not the observed event rates match expected event rates in subgroups of the model 
population. Hosmer and Lemeshow recommend partitioning the observations into 10 
equal sized groups according to their predicted probabilities. Then, 
G2HL=
 















! = Expected number of cases in the jth group 
nj = Number of observartion in the jth group 
Oj = yij
i
! =  Observed number of cases in the jth group 
(Hosmer, 2000) 
 
Figure 13.   Hosmer-Lomeshow test result for the base model 
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Figure 14.   Hosmer-Lomeshow test result for the alternative model 
The pseudo-R2 value for the base model is 0.17 and is 0.22 for the alternative 
model. Evaluating the two models, we see that pseudo-R2 value is higher for the 
alternative model. The results of Hosmer-Lomeshow tests are presented in Figure 13 for 
the base model and Figure 14 for the alternative model and we see that there is no 
significant difference between two figures. The p values for the both models are zero and 
chi-square values are 1941.7 for the base model and 2702.9 for the alternative one. Since 
a large p-value shows a good fit, neither of our models fit very well by this measure. 
Even though the pseudo-R2 square value is higher for the model with interactions is 
better, we preferred to analyze the base model because the results of the base model are 
easier to interpret. The alternative model suggested by stepwise logistic regression is 






In symbols, the base model says, 
ln ( p i/(1! p i) ) = 0 + 1INJURY_COUNTRY_AF + 
2INJURY_COUNTRY_IRAQ + 3MARITAL_STATUS_M + 
4MARITAL_STATUS_F + 5AGE + 6 GENDER_M + 
7GENDER_F + 8PAY_GRADE_E13 + 9PAY_GRADE_E45 + 
10PAY_GRADE_E69 + 11ORG_COMP_CODE_R + 
12ORG_COMP_CODE_G + 13ORG_COMP_CODE_V + 
14DEPENDENT_QUANTITY + 15TIME_IN_SERVICE + 
16MOS_C + 17MOS_CS + 18MOS_CSS + 
19 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_1 + 20 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_2 + 
21DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_3 + 22DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_4 + 
23DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_5 
where, 
INJURY_COUNTRY_AF = killed or injured in Afghanistan 
INJURY_COUNTRY_IRAQ = killed or injured in Iraq 
MARITAL_STATUS_M = married 
MARITAL_STATUS_N = never married 
MARITAL_STATUS_D = divorced 
AGE = age of the serviceman 
GENDER_M = male serviceman 
GENDER_F = female serviceman 
PAY_GRADE_E13 = serviceman serving pay grades E1 through E3 













PAY_GRADE_E69 = serviceman serving pay grades E6 through E9 
PAY_GRADE_OF = officers 
ORG_COMP_CODE _R = serviceman of regular forces 
ORG_COMP_CODE _G = serviceman of guard forces 
ORG_COMP_CODE _V = serviceman of reserve forces 
DEPENDENT_QUANTITY = number of dependents of the serviceman 
TIME_IN_SERVICE = number of years the serviceman served 
MOS_C = serviceman of combat forces 
MOS_CS = serviceman of combat support forces 
MOS_CSS = serviceman of combat service support forces 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_1 = serviceman deployed one time 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_2 = serviceman deployed two times 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_3 = serviceman deployed three times 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_4 = serviceman deployed four times 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_5 = serviceman deployed five or more times 
 
B. VARIABLE DEFINITION 
1. Dependent Variable  
A binary variable was used to define a serviceman who was injured or killed. If 
the serviceman was killed or injured in a hostile action, this variable was given the value 
of 1 and the serviceman was classified as “killed or injured.” If the serviceman was not 
killed or injured, the variable was given the value of 0. In this study, no distinction was 
made between killed and injured. Both these cases were classified in the same category. 
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2. Explanatory Variables 
 a. Pay Grade 
Pay grades E1, E2, and E3 are taken as a group and presented by E13. Pay 
grades E4 and E5 are taken as a group and indicated by E45. Pay grades E6, E7, E8 and 
E9 are taken as a group and shown by E69, and all officers are taken as a group and 
indicated by Officer. The E45 pay-grade group casualty status makes the 55% of all 
casualties, followed by the E13 pay-grade group with 21%. With those statistics, 
servicemen serving in these two pay grades are more likely to get injured or killed. Pay 
grades E69 are expected to be less involved in hostile actions than other pay-grade groups 
because they are more likely assigned to staff or headquarter positions. So fewer 
casualties for servicemen of pay grades E69 are expected. 
b. Gender 
This variable presents the sex of the serviceman. Male servicemen 
constitute the majority of the army and they are expected to be more involved in hostile 
actions. Females are not allowed to serve in combat troops, which decreases exposure to 
hostile attacks. This makes males more exposed to hostile incidents. 
c. Age 
This variable gives the age of the serviceman at the time of the incident. 
The general expectation is that a junior serviceman is more likely to get killed or injured 
than the senior serviceman, because juniors are assigned to posts involving more danger 
than are seniors. 
d. Marital Status 
This variable gives the marital status of the serviceman at the time of the 
incident. Marital status was categorized into the levels of married, never married, and 
divorced. 
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e. Injury Country  
This variable explains where the incident happened. In this study, only 
hostile incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan were taken into account. 
f. Organization Component Code 
The U.S. Army consists of regular, reserve and guard forces; the 
organization component code was categorized into these three variables. Regular forces 
make up the majority of the army, and it is expected that regular forces are more likely to 
be killed or injured. Analyzing the univariate statistics in Figure 8, we see that 27% of 
regular forces, 25.9% of guard forces, and 23.2% of reserve forces were injured during 
the two wars, which is consistent with our anticipation. 
g. Time in Service 
This variable explains the total years served before a serviceman was 
injured or killed. Time in service was calculated with the difference between the death or 
injury date and enlistment date. It is expected that as serviceman gains more experience 
and training, he is better prepared for hostile actions and less likely to get killed or 
injured. But a contrary assumption would be that in the early years of service, a 
serviceman is assigned to posts involving more danger. 
h. Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) 
This variable explains the military occupation specialties of the 
servicemen. To simplify, infantry, armor, field artillery, combat-engineer and air-defense 
artillery were grouped as combat troops. The chemical corps, general engineering, 
military-intelligence corps, military-police corps, signal corps and Army aviation were 
grouped as combat-support troops. The remaining military occupation specialties were 
grouped as combat-service support troops. The general anticipation is that those serving 
as combat troops are more exposed to danger and more likely to get killed or injured. 
 35 
i. Deployment Count 
This variable explains the number of deployment a serviceman had at time 
of incident. The Deployment Count variable was categorized in five groups. The 
servicemen were categorized to group 1 through group 4 with respect to number of 
deployments and group 5 includes the servicemen with 5 or more deployments. The 
common-sense expectation is that as the deployment numbers go up, the serviceman 
gains more experience and orientation to the battle environment and is less likely to get 
killed or injured. 
C. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The effect of each independent variable was determined by trying all one-term 
deletions from the base model using the dropterm function. (Venables, 2002). Based on 
the results of this function, we decide whether a variable is statistically significant to 
analyze or not. 
 Df Deviance AIC LRT Pr(Chi) 
none  105485 105523   
Gender 1 105499 105535 13.3 0.000272 *** 
Injury_Country 1 105551 105587 66.2 4.132e-16 *** 
Marital_Status 2 105610 105644 124.8 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count 4 105809 105839 323.6 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade 3 106874 106906 1389.1 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dependent_Quantity 1 106944 106980 1458.9 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Age 1 107746 107782 2260.9 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Org_Comp_Code 2 108256 108290 2770.2 < 2.2e-16 *** 
MOS 2 114532 114566 9046.5 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Time_In_Service 1 115306 115342 9820.6 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Table 8.   Dropterm function results for the base model 
Table 8 shows the results of the dropterm function our model. The effects of the 
variables are presented in ascending order. We see that the Gender was the least effective 
while Time_In_Service was the most effective among all variables included in the model. 
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Table 9 shows the results of summary function for the base model. This model 
demonstrates the effects of injury country, marital status, gender, pay grade, organization 
component code, dependent-quantity code, time in service, number of deployments, and 
MOS. 
Term Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept 2.0586 0.08824 23.327 < 2e-16 *** 
Marital_Status_Code_M 0.2005 0.04172 4.807 1.53e-06 *** 
Marital_Status_Code_N 0.0087 0.04367 0.201 0.8406 
Age -0.0897 0.00200 -44.744 < 2e-16 *** 
Gender_ M -0.1820 0.04918 -3.701 0.000215 *** 
Pay_Grade_E45 -0.1275 0.02160 -5.903 3.58e-09 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69 -1.1026 0.03481 -31.669 < 2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_Officers -0.4880 0.04100 -11.903 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Comp_Code_R -1.1560 0.02529 -45.704 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Comp_Code_V 0.2075 0.03792 5.473 4.43e-08 *** 
Dependent_Quantity_Code 0.0203 0.00052 38.803 < 2e-16 *** 
Time_Inservice 0.2305 0.00256 90.022 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_2  -0.1590 0.01879 -8.460 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_3 -0.4157 0.02473 -16.810 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_4 -0.3791 0.03828 -9.905 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_5 -0.1038 0.05489 -1.892 0.058432 
MOS_CS -1.4797 0.01952 -65.091 < 2e-16 *** 
MOS_CSS  -1.5419 0.02273 -78.993 < 2e-16 *** 
Injury_Country_Iraq -0.1363 0.01671 -8.156 3.46e-16 *** 
  * significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %;  *** significant at 1 % 
Table 9.   Summary function results for the base model 
1. Pay Grade 
In our model, the base case for pay grade is E1–E3. In Figure 5, we see that the 
majority of casualties occurred in the E4–E5 pay grades, with 55% followed by the E13 
pay-grade group with 21%. Our initial descriptive study is not very consistent with one of 
the oldest observations in the social sciences, that lower-ranking servicemen are exposed 
to a greater risk of death than higher-ranking individuals (Buzzel and Preston, 2007). The 
study by Buzzel and Preston also shows that in the Army, privates first class have a death 
 37 
risk three times greater than the combined categories of major, colonel, and general; and 
enlisted men have a 38% higher mortality than officers. In the Marine Corps, lance 
corporals have a death risk 4.18 times greater than that of majors, colonels, and generals, 
and the single highest mortality group in any service consist of lance corporals, whose 
death risk is 3.1 times that of all troops in Iraq. 
The base case for pay grade is E1–E3. After adjusting to other casualties, in our 
multivariate model we see that all other pay grades have lower odds ratio. The odds ratio 
values are 0.88 for E4–E5, 0.66 for Officers and 0.33 for E6–E9 pay grades. With our 
new results, we may infer that all the pay grades have lower odds ratios of getting killed 
or injured than pay grades E1–E3. But that difference is not as large as has been 
mentioned in previous studies. 
2. Marital Status 
The base case for marital status in our model is divorced servicemen. In 
descriptive statistics, we see that 27.7% of married, 28.7% of never married, and 22% of 
divorced servicemen were either injured or killed. Our model results show that a married 
serviceman is more likely to get injured or killed than both divorced and never married 
serviceman. The odds ratios for divorced and never married servicemen are very close 
that we can say that there is no significant difference between those two. In our model, 
we may conclude married servicemen are more likely to get injured or killed. 
3. Gender 
The base case for gender in the model is female. In Figure 11, we see that 98% of 
casualties were males. In both wars, 29.2% of male and 18.6% of female servicemen 
were injured or killed. With these statistics, the casualty of a male serviceman is more 
likely to occur, but in our model we perceive what is contrary to general expectation. A 
male serviceman has a lower odds ratio than an otherwise female serviceman. We may 
interpret that a male serviceman is less likely to get killed or injured due to hostile 
incident. The reasons for this result might be the physical capacity, better training and 
higher orientation to the conditions of the battlefield. 
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4. Injury Country 
In our model, the base case for country of injury is Afghanistan. The number of 
casualties in Iraq was more than twice the number that occurred in Afghanistan. Dividing 
the casualty numbers by the total number of troops served, we get the ratio of 29.4% 
casualty percentage for troops who served in Iraq and 27.1% for troops who served in 
Afghanistan. In multivariate analysis, a serviceman serving in Iraq has an odds ratio of 
0.87, which is very close to 1. We may infer that there is not much difference in the 
casualty status between the two countries. 
5. Organization Component Code 
The base case for organization component code in our model is guard forces. In 
the descriptive-statistics part, we see that 29.2% of regular forces, 28.3% of guard forces 
and 25.5% of reserve forces were either injured or killed. These ratios looks logical 
because regular forces are expected to be more exposed to hostile attacks than the other 
two groups. In our model, we see that regular forces are less likely to get killed or injured 
than other forces. The reserve forces have the highest odds ratio, which means they are 
predicted by the model more susceptible to death or injury. The level of training the 
forces get might explain this contradiction. Regular forces have more experience in the 
field and are more accustomed to the conditions of the battlefield, while the other two 
forces might have less experience. 
6. Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) 
The base case for MOS in our model is combat troops, which make the majority 
in the sample data. In our model, we see that the odds ratios for combat support and 
combat-service support troops indicate that they are less likely to get injured or killed 
than combat troops. This result looks convincing, because CS and CSS troops do not 
engage the enemy as C troops do. 
7. Deployment Count 
The base case for Deployment Count in our model is the first deployment. 
Interpreting the coefficients in Table 9, we see that servicemen in their first deployment 
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are more likely to get killed or injured. Servicemen with two deployments have odds ratio 
of 0.85 and servicemen with three and four deployments got nearly the same odds ratios, 
which are about 0.66. Even though the odds ratio for five or more deployments is 0.90, 
the p value is 0.06, which is statistically insignificant. We may interpret that as the 
number of deployments increases, the servicemen are less likely to killed or injured. The 
reason for this result might be that as the number of deployment increases, the 
serviceman gains more experience and is better oriented to the battlefield. Another factor 
is the fact that the pay grade of the servicemen increases as the number of deployments 
increases. Our pay grade analysis suggests that servicemen with higher pay grades are 
less likely to involve in hostile incidents. 
8. Age 
 
Figure 15.   Probability of Casualty of MOS vs. Age 
Figure 15 shows the probability of casualty of MOS with respect to age. We got 
Figure 15 with the help of the predict function in R. Predict is a generic function for 
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predictions from the results of various model fitting functions. The function invokes 
particular methods, which depend on the class of the first argument. (Chambers and 
Hastie, 1992) The first argument in our study was a male never married serviceman who 
was 28 years old and serving in Afghanistan. His pay grade was E45, and was serving as 
regular force in CSS troops. He had been serving in the Army for eight years and was on 
his second deployment. This particular serviceman was replicated for a number of times 
and was fitted in our model to see the effect of time in service on MOS. Figure 15 shows 
the probability of casualty of MOS with respect to the time they served. We see that the 
probability of casualty decreases for all troops as the age of the servicemen grows. C 
troops have the highest probability of casualty in all ages. CS and CSS troops have about 
the same probability of being killed or injured. As the age grows, we see that the gap 
between C and other two troops decreases. This might be explained by the fact that as the 
age grows C troops serviceman might be assigned to posts which are less susceptible to 
hostile incidents. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter contains the results of multivariate analysis of the casualty status of 
servicemen in the U.S. Army. The chapter started by describing the variables used in the 
model, then multivariate analysis was presented separately for each variable. 
The results suggest that pay grades E1 through E3 are more likely to be involved 
in hostile incidents than other pay-grade groups, and this exposure to danger decreases as 
the pay grades increase. The findings for gender are not parallel to popular ideas. It is 
expected that males will be more exposed to hostile incidents than females. But even 
though the difference is not large, our results show that males are less likely to get killed 
or injured. In terms of the effects of marital status, our study shows that married 
servicemen are more likely to be involved in hostile incidents. In our model, we found 
that regular forces have a lower risk of engaging in hostile incidents than guard and 
reserve forces, which is contrary to general expectation. The results for MOS were as 
expected. Combat troops are more likely to be killed or injured than other troops. 
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As a conclusion for our multivariate model, a serviceman who is female, married, 
serving in the reserve forces, serving in a combat troop, between pay grades E1–E3, 
serving in Iraq, serving the first deployment is the serviceman with most potential to get 
injured or killed in the U.S. Army. 
The data set contained information on death or injury date, injury status, death or 
injury country and city, service, MOS, gender, education, race and ethnicity, age, marital 
status, number of deployments, armed-force time in service, and pay grade. 
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study is to create a profile of the U.S. Troops who have been 
killed or injured due to hostile incident in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
The second chapter of the thesis provided a background of the wars and review of 
previous studies. U.S. troops have been involved in two major wars since 2001 and over 
35,000 Army servicemen have been either injured or killed due to hostile incidents in 
Iraq or Afghanistan. 
There are few published studies concerning the hostility casualties of U.S. troops 
in the two major wars. Previous studies include only deaths that occurred between 2003 
and 2007 and do not differentiate the causes of death. These deaths include both combat 
and non-combat related and the studies cover only those incidents that happened in Iraq, 
whereas in our study, we have focused on combat-related casualties, including both 
deaths and injuries, and we covered incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2003 and 
2011. Earlier studies covered the Marine Corps, Air Force, Army and Navy. Our study 
focused on combat-related casualties of Army servicemen only. 
The third chapter provided descriptive statistics of the data. The file used in this 
study was obtained from the DMDC. It was built from active-duty personnel extract files, 
covering 2003 to 2011. The file contained 48,312 records of servicemen either injured or 
killed and 98,812 records of servicemen who served in the 2003–2011 period with no 
injury. In our data, we used only servicemen killed or injured in hostile action, of which 
there were 35,698. 
Preliminary analysis shows that after 2008, there is a significant decrease in 
hostile casualties in Iraq and a significant increase in casualties in Afghanistan. Our 
results shows that the time in service before getting killed or injured decreases, the 
average age of the servicemen who was injured or killed decreases, and the number of 
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casualties of servicemen between pay grade E1 and E3 increases. We may infer that both 
the average age of the U.S. troops involved in hostile actions and the average age of the 
Army is getting younger. 
The fourth chapter covered the methodology utilized, which includes a brief 
overview of logistic regression, a description of the variables and model and the 
analytical results. Also in this chapter are the results of multivariate analysis of the 
casualty status of servicemen in the U.S. Army. 
The results suggest that pay grades through E1 and E3 are more likely to be 
involved in hostile incidents than other pay-grade groups and that exposure to danger 
decreases as pay grade increases. 
 The findings for gender are not consistent with popular notions. It is expected 
that males will be more exposed to hostile incidents than females. Even though the 
difference is not large, our results show that males are less likely to get killed or injured.  
In terms of the effects of marital status, after adjusting to the other variables, our 
study shows that married servicemen are more likely to be involved in hostile incidents. 
In our model, we found that regular forces have a lower risk of engaging in hostile 
incidents than guard and reserve forces, which is contrary to general expectation. The 
type of training the forces go through and their battlefield experience might affect this 
result. It is known that regular forces get more training and have more war experience. 
The results for MOS were as expected. Combat troops are more likely to be killed 
or injured than other troops. 
As a conclusion for our multivariate model, an actual-duty person who is female, 
married, serving in guard forces in a combat troop, between pay grades E1-E3, and 
serving in Iraq is the most likely actual-duty person to be injured or killed in U.S. Army. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this study, the types of hostile casualties have not been investigated. The reason 
for the hostile incident, integrated in multivariate models, may reveal noteworthy results. 
The incident could involve an improvised, explosive device (IED), direct attack, suicide 
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bombers, mortar or artillery fire, or a traffic accident.  Research on casualties with respect 
to type of incident may give decision planners valuable insights about the casualty status 
of troops serving in the battlefield. 
In our study, we did not differentiate between killed and injured; we treated all 
events as hostile casualties. Studies examining killed and injured events separately may 
produce stronger results. For pay grade, we classified the ranks as four groups: E1–E3, 
E4–E5, E6–E9 and officers. A study focused on one particular rank may create clearer 
results about that rank. 
Due to data restrictions, we studied only servicemen of the Army. Studies 
including all the forces may explain the differences among casualty types. 
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APPENDIX. LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 
ALTERNATIVE MODEL WITH INTERACTIONS 
The alternative model in symbol is: 
ln ( / (1- ) ) = 0 + 1INJURY_COUNTRY_AF +  
2 INJURY_COUNTRY_IRAQ + 3MARITAL_STATUS_M +  
4MARITAL_STATUS_F + 5AGE + 6 GENDER_M +  
7GENDER_F + ! 8PAY_GRADE_E13 + 9PAY_GRADE_E45 +  
10PAY_GRADE_E69 + ! 11 ORG_COMP_CODE _R +  
12 ORG_COMP_CODE_G + 13ORG_COMP_CODE_V +  
14DEPENDENT_QUANTITY + 15TIME_IN_SERVICE +  
16 MOS_C + 17 MOS_CS + 18 MOS_CSS +  
19 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_1 + 20 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT _2 + 
21 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_3 + 22 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT _4 +  
23 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_5 + 24 ORG_COMP_CODE:AGE +  
! 25PAY_GRADE_E13:AGE + ! 26 ORG_COMP_CODE:MOS +  
27DEPENDENT_QUANTITY:TIME_IN_SERVICE +  
28ORG_COMP_CODE:DEPLOYMENT_COUNT +  
29 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT:AGE +  
30 DEPLOYMENT_COUNT: PAY_GRADE +  
31INJURY_COUNTRY:MOS 
 Df Deviance AIC LRT Pr(Chi) 
none 	   105029 105155   
Gender 1 105042 105166 12.4 0.0004242 
Marital_Status 2 105151 105273 121.2 < 2.2e-16 *** 
MOS:Injury_Country 2 105159 105281 129.5 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dep_Count:Pay_Grade 12 105273 105375 243.2 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dep_Count:Org_Code 8 105267 105377 237.6 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dep_Count:Age 4 105329 105447 300.1 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Org_Code:MOS 4 105331 105449 300.5 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Dep_Qty:Time_InService 1 105417 105541 387.9 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Age:Pay_Grade 3 105865 105985 835.8 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Org_Code:Pay_Grade 6 106308 106422 1279.0 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Age:Org_Code 2 107596 107718 2566.6 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Org_Code:Time_InService 2 119056 119178 14026.5 < 2.2e-16 *** 

















Table 10.   Dropterm function results for the alternative model 
Term Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept ! 1.4337 0.13678 ! 10.482 < 2e-16 *** 
Marital_Status_Code_M 0.2145 0.04147 5.179 < 2e-16 *** 
Marital_Status_Code_N 0.0259 0.04324 0.6 5.03e-05 *** 
Age 0.0419 0.00464 9.029 < 2e-16 *** 
Gender_ M ! 0.1730 0.04826 ! 3.586 0.000335 *** 
Pay_Grade_E45 0.4986 0.12126 4.112 3.92e-05 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69 2.8100 0.18492 15.201 < 2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_Officers 4.0209 0.23332 17.233 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Comp_Code_R 3.1919 0.10068 31.703 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Comp_Code_V 0.0870 0.17090 0.509 0.610467 
Dependent_Quantity_Code 0.0295 0.00066 44.368 < 2e-16 *** 
Time_Inservice 0.0071 0.00051 13.999 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_2 0.4315 0.10830 3.984 6.77e-05 *** 
Deployment_Count_3 1.6497 0.16548 9.969 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_4 2.8205 0.32114 8.783 < 2e-16 *** 
Deployment_Count_5 3.6501 0.58283 6.263 < 2e-16 *** 
MOS_CS ! 1.5184 0.06166 ! 24.623 < 2e-16 *** 
MOS_CSS ! 0.9457 0.04977 ! 19 < 2e-16 *** 
Injury_Country_Iraq ! 0.3135 0.02138 ! 14.66 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_R:Time_Inservice 0.3776 0.00375 100.709 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_V:Time_Inservice 0.0026 0.00110 2.338 0.0119375 
Org_Code_R:Age ! 0.1718 0.00375 ! 45.827 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_V:Age 0.0077 0.00487 1.599 0.109804 
Pay_Grade_E45:Age ! 0.0248 0.00447 ! 5.546 2.93e-08 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69:Age ! 0.1013 0.00555 ! 18.256 < 2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_OF:Age ! 0.1564 0.00742 ! 21.057 < 2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_E45:Org_Code_R ! 0.3073 0.06182 ! 4.971 6.66e-07 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69:Org_Code_R ! 2.3021 0.08932 ! 25.773 < 2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_OF:Org_Code_R ! 0.3240 0.10650 ! 3.043 0.002343 ** 
Pay_Grade_E45:Org_Code_V 0.5255 0.12308 4.27 1.95e-05 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69:Org_Code_V 0.6909 0.15215 4.541 5.59e-06 *** 
Pay_Grade_OF:Org_Code_V 1.4806 0.16333 9.066 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_R:MOS_CS ! 0.0019 0.00011 ! 17.857 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_V:MOS_CS ! 0.3954 0.05562 ! 7.11 1.16e-12 *** 
Org_Code_R:MOS_CSS ! 0.7931 0.09989 ! 7.94 2.02e-15 *** 
Org_Code_V:MOS_CSS ! 0.7531 0.04602 ! 16.36 < 2e-16 *** 
Table 11.   Summary function results for the alternative model 
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Term Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Org_Code_R:Dep.Count_2 ! 0.8382 0.08345  10.044 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_V:Dep.Count_2 ! 0.4738 0.04700 ! 10.044 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_R:Dep.Count_3 ! 0.4678 0.07899 ! 5.923 3.17e-09 *** 
Org_Code_V:Dep.Count_3 ! 0.8269 0.07313 ! 11.307 < 2e-16 *** 
Org_Code_R:Dep.Count_3 ! 0.3100 0.12189 ! 2.544 0.010970 *   
Org_Code_V:Dep.Count_3 ! 0.9834 0.14903 ! 6.599 4.13e-11 *** 
Org_Code_R:Dep.Count_4 ! 0.4825 0.24592 ! 1.962 0.049732 *   
Org_Code_V:Dep.Count_4 ! 0.4825 0.25378 ! 4.499 6.82e-06 *** 
Org_Code_R:Dep.Count_5 ! 1.1418 0.41711 ! 0.415  0.67804  
Org_Code_V:Dep.Count_5 ! 0.1731 0.00351 ! 6.417 1.39e-10 *** 
Age:Dep.Count_2 ! 0.0225 0.00504 ! 12.504 < 2e-16 *** 
Age:Dep.Count_3 ! 0.0630 0.00836 ! 11.882 < 2e-16 *** 
Age:Dep.Count_4 ! 0.0993 0.01215 ! 7.713 1.23e-14 *** 
Age:Dep.Count_5 ! 0.0937 0.05088 4.818 1.45e-06 *** 
Pay_Grade_E45:Dep.Count_2 0.2451 0.07808 8.801 < 2e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69:Dep.Count_2 0.6872 0.09352 2.953 0.003151 **  
Pay_Grade_Officers:Dep.Count_2 0.2761454 0.08702 -0.154   0.877534 
Pay_Grade_E45:Dep.Count_3 ! 0.0134101 0.10932 8.084 6.28e-16 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69:Dep.Count_3 0.8837333 0.13325 0.258  0.796426 
Pay_Grade_Officers:Dep.Count_3 0.0343752 0.19515 -0.05  0.960489 
Pay_Grade_E45:Dep.Count_4 ! 0.0096677 0.20934 4.744 2.09e-06 *** 
Pay_Grade_E69:Dep.Count_4 0.9931975 0.24232 2.983 0.002852 **  
Pay_Grade_Officers:Dep.Count_4 0.7229051 0.42807 ! 1.211   0.225978 
Pay_Grade_E45:Dep.Count_5 ! 0.5183075 0.43646 0.95   0.341976 
Pay_Grade_E69:Dep.Count_5 0.4147561 0.46617 ! 0.288   0.773079 
Pay_Grade_Officers:Dep.Count_5 ! 0.1344222 0.04988 11.164 < 2e-16 *** 
Injury_Country_Iraq:MOS_CS 0.5568558 0.03974 1.872   0.061260    
Injury_Country_Iraq:MOS_CSS 0.0743897 0.03974 0.466178 < 2e-16 *** 
Table 11.     Summary function results for the alternative model (cont.) 
Where, 
INJURY_COUNTRY_AF = killed or injured in Afghanistan 
INJURY_COUNTRY_IRAQ = killed or injured in Iraq 
MARITAL_STATUS_M = married 
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MARITAL_STATUS_N = never married 
MARITAL_STATUS_D = divorced 
AGE = age of the serviceman 
GENDER_M = male serviceman 
GENDER_F = female serviceman 
PAY_GRADE_E13 = serviceman serving pay grades E1 through E3 
PAY_GRADE_E45 = serviceman serving pay grades E4 through E5 
PAY_GRADE_E69 = serviceman serving pay grades E6 through E9 
PAY_GRADE_OF = officers 
ORG_COMP_CODE _R = serviceman of regular forces 
ORG_COMP_CODE _G = serviceman of guard forces 
ORG_COMP_CODE _V = serviceman of reserve forces 
DEPENDENT_QUANTITY = number of dependents of the serviceman 
TIME_IN_SERVICE = number of years the serviceman served 
MOS_C = serviceman of combat forces 
MOS_CS = serviceman of combat support forces 
MOS_CSS = serviceman of combat service support forces 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_1 = serviceman deployed one time 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_2 = serviceman deployed two times 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_3 = serviceman deployed three times 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_4 = serviceman deployed four times 
DEPLOYMENT_COUNT_5 = serviceman deployed five or more times 
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